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Abstract. Numerous public-private partnership (PPP) infrastructure projects have been operating in China after nearly 30 
years of development. Surprisingly, few lessons and experiences have been drawn from these existing cases, thereby creat-
ing an urgent demand for a comprehensive evaluation of their performance. Thus, this paper presents a timely contribution 
to the assessment of a representative PPP project in China’s water sector, the Chengdu No. 6 Water Plant B Project, from a 
lifecycle perspective. Through a triangulation method, the project is generally deemed a success providing instructive les-
sons on the future evolutionary development of PPPs in China despite several imperfections caused by particular historical 
factors. Moreover, this paper advances the performance measurement of PPPs offering empirical insights to promote the 
efficacy of conceptual performance measurement frameworks. The outcomes of this research are especially valuable to the 
current Chinese PPP community where huge opportunities and challenges simultaneously exist.
Keywords: public-private partnership, water sector, lifecycle performance measurement, China, case study.
Introduction
The concept of public-private partnerships (PPPs) can be 
defined as long period co-operation between public and 
private sectors to jointly provide public products or ser-
vices to which the risks, costs and resources related are 
shared by the two sectors (Ham & Koppenjan, 2001). The 
PPP concept has been utilized in China over 30 years now. 
Despite the inconsistent development of PPPs, the total 
number of PPP projects initiated has considerably ex-
panded as national policies have been repeatedly revised. 
According to the World Bank’s Private Participation in In-
frastructure (PPI) Database, the total number of PPI pro-
jects in China that have achieved financial closure as of 
July 2017, is a significant 1,373. Even so, this number does 
not include projects initiated by state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) who are in fact major investors in Chinese PPP 
projects. Consequently, the actual number of PPP projects 
is far higher than that indicated by the PPI Database. In 
reality, the total number has been estimated to be as high 
as 7,000 to 8,000 (Dayue Consulting, 2014).
Such a large scale indicates that various participants of 
PPPs in China believe that the purported benefits of PPPs, 
such as value for money (VfM) and improved service pro-
vision, can be realized (Leiringer & Schweber, 2010). How-
ever, these benefits were mainly claimed by government 
documentations and industry reports related to PPPs (e.g. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010; HM Treasury, 2008), where-
as a number of research articles have emphasized that PPP 
performance practically remains unclear (Holmes, Capper, 
& Hudson, 2006; Robinson & Scott, 2009; Henjewele, Sun, 
& Fewings, 2014). Thus, the actual performance of PPPs is 
deemed a continuing topic of debate. The reasons for the 
difficulty in accurately evaluating PPP performance may 
vary, of which, the complexity of performance concept per 
se could be one. Performance consists of more than “results” 
or “outcomes” that are suggested by some policy-makers, but 
is multiplication of concepts and measures (e.g. inputs, out-
puts, outcomes, efficiency, and process etc.) (Talbot, 2010). 
This complexity has frequently led to challenge of knowing 
what happens to most of the factors as simply as assessing 
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the “outputs” or “results”. For PPPs, the issue is further com-
pounded by the intricate nature of the PPP mode which 
inevitably weakens the effectiveness of most existing perfor-
mance measurement means designed for normal business 
process (Liu, Love, Smith, Regan, & Palaneeswaran, 2015b).
The situation in China’s PPP domain, where the con-
tinuing immaturity of its environment for developing PPPs 
remains, is no exception and probably even more critical. 
A few critics even stressed that China’s overinvestment 
in unproductive PPPs has given rise to many problems, 
such as rising debts, unstable financial market, and frag-
ile economy (Ansar, Flyvbjerg, Budzier, & Lunn, 2016). 
Determining the actual performance of PPPs in China, 
and drawing lessons and experiences from prior cases are 
extremely important. Such processes would provide cru-
cial basis for improving PPP management strategies and 
facilitating sustainable development of PPPs in the future.
This research aims to fill this gap by conducting an 
empirical study on the performance measurement of 
PPPs. In particular, this research considers the case of the 
Chengdu No. 6 water plant B project (hereinafter referred 
to as the Chengdu Project) to investigate its lifecycle per-
formance. Using lifecycle of the Chengdu Project as the 
unit of analysis is mainly because the lifecycle philosophy 
is vital for PPP projects requiring integrated duties on de-
sign, finance, construction and maintenance (EIB, 2012). 
Essentially, VfM is recognized as the paramount objective 
of PPP, which cannot be defined, let al.ne to be achieved, 
without a lifecycle perspective (HM Treasury, 2004). No-
tably, the Chengdu Project was the first PPP project in 
the Chinese water sector and the only one having gone 
through the entire concession period in this sector. A tri-
angulation method was employed to collect and analyze 
data, comprising literature review, archival analysis, struc-
tured questionnaire survey and a post-survey interview. 
The specific research objectives include the following:
 – Evaluating the lifecycle performance of the repre-
sentative project;
 – Identifying project lessons and experiences and inter-
preting dissent from lifecycle and historical perspec-
tives; and
 – Proposing constructive implications for future devel-
opment of water PPPs in China as well as for future 
research on PPP performance measurement.
Consequently, practitioners in the field of PPP water 
projects will be interested to obtain the lessons and expe-
riences extracted from this project as evaluated over its 
entire lifecycle. Thus, the findings are particularly helpful 
to PPP participants in pursuing lifecycle success of PPPs 
in developing countries. Moreover, the research outcomes 
would contribute to the ongoing research on PPP perfor-
mance measurement by providing empirical insights into 
the improvement of those conceptual findings.
The next section briefly reviews the application of the 
PPP approach in China’s water sector and the literature on 
performance measurement of PPPs, followed by method-
ology, background of the Chengdu Project, data analysis 
and findings, discussion, and conclusions.
1. Literature review
1.1. Performance debate of PPPs
As previously mentioned, the benefits of PPPs have 
been vigorously propagandized by governments which 
lack the access to funds and capability to provide pub-
lic infrastructures and services. Many documentations 
and reports from governments or their client agencies 
repeatedly claimed the positive performance of PPPs. For 
example, the Victoria State Government (2017) claimed 
that PPPs benefited this state by providing “world-class” 
infrastructure and public services for over 20 years. As 
the initiator of private finance initiative (PFI), one of the 
counterparts of PPPs, the UK governments maintained 
the continuous promotion and practice of this approach 
since 1992 (HM Treasury, 2013b; HM Treasury, 2013a; 
HM Treasury, 2016). The positive performance of PPPs 
can also be seen in a few guide references compiled 
by international cooperation organizations such as the 
World Bank, European Investment Bank (EIB), and 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), which further spread 
the popularity of PPPs worldwide (World Bank, 2014; 
EIB, 2012; ADB, 2008). Consequently, various practition-
ers have trusted this view and taken PPPs as the main, 
if not the only, methods to develop public infrastructure 
and services, just as what China’s water sector has expe-
rienced in the past two decades.
However, questions and criticisms of the purported 
benefits of PPPs have been also constant (Hodge, 2004). 
Holmes et al. (2006) investigated the health care PFI in 
the UK and argued the difficulty of demonstrating VfM 
because of the uniqueness of each PPP project. Hen-
jewele et al. (2014) compared health care and transport 
PPPs and then concluded that considerable cost and time 
overruns and changes still existed in the development 
process of PPPs. Pollock, Price, and Player (2007) inves-
tigated five studies cited by the UK’s Treasury as sup-
port to its positive claim of PPPs and found that only 
one study compared PFI and traditional procurement, 
in which sampling bias and flawed analysis extremely 
weakened conclusion to be supportive to the Treasury’s 
claim. Hodge and Greve (2007) summarized manifold 
possible reasons for the contradictory evidence delivered 
by PPP performance evaluations. As for China, Ansar 
et al. (2016) examined the PPP performance in its trans-
port sector and found severe cost overruns and benefit 
deficiencies. Despite having investigated many sectors 
on their performance of PPPs, the attention paid to the 
water sector was found to remain scarce. Most prior re-
search has focused on developed economies where PPP 
model is not the chief means for water projects (Hall, 
Lobina, & Terhorst, 2013). However, this scenario is not 
the case for developing countries, such as China, where 
numerous water PPPs exist. Thus, for those developing 
countries, an urgent need consequently arises to estab-
lish a systematic investigation of the performance of wa-
ter PPPs.
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1.2. Application of PPPs in China’s water sector
The water sector (i.e., water supply and sewage treatment) 
accounts for the largest proportion among China’s vari-
ous PPP infrastructure sectors. Cheng, Ke, Lin, Yang, and 
Cai (2016) analyzed all the current PPP projects in Chi-
na, which are identifiable through the internet; authors 
then claimed that water projects account for 54.6% of all 
the projects. Although large, the proportion is explicable 
since water projects are in high demand, tend to have 
stable returns, and require only a relatively small invest-
ment, with a correspondingly low investment risk. Indeed, 
the water sector was where one of the three pilot PPP at-
tempts was initiated by the central government, back in 
the mid-1990s, consequently providing a precedent by 
which foreign and private investors found access to the 
market (Cheng et al., 2016). And yet, despite the number 
of projects to date, China’s urbanization remains far from 
complete. In the near future, a growing number of people 
will move into cities, implying that the demand for water 
infrastructure will remain undiminished. Thus, opportu-
nities for investing in the Chinese water sector through 
PPPs can be expected to remain strong.
The Chengdu Project is one of the most well-known 
among existing PPP water projects, its renown lies in a 
couple of factors. First, it is the first municipal water supply 
project built in the form of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
in China. Second, it was regarded as a highly successful 
case; being awarded the “Best Project Financing Deal of 
the Year” award, in 1999, by “International Project Finance.” 
Still, it has also been subject to severe criticism due to its 
negative impact on several other bodies, such as the water 
company and the government of Chengdu. Despite mixed 
reviews, the Chengdu Project is a representative test case 
benchmarked by numerous later projects in Chinese water 
sector over the past two decades. Thus, the lessons and ex-
periences drawn from this project can be expected to offer 
valuable insights for future PPP applications in China.
1.3. Performance measurement framework of PPPs
Performance measurement is generally defined as a pro-
cess in which organizations or individuals determine the 
extent of their success in reaching their desired objectives 
after a series of management actions (Neely, Adams, & 
Kennerley, 2002; Kagioglou, Cooper, & Aouad, 2001; Bitit-
ci, Carrie, & McDevitt, 1997). It is viewed as a revolution in 
management, deriving from the business area and having 
extensively spread out to other industries (Bassioni, Price, 
& Hassan, 2004; Neely, 1999). In the construction indus-
try, performance was once mainly represented by several 
factors, such as cost, time, and quality, which were soon 
found insufficient to comprehensively describe a complex 
construction project (Kagioglou et al. 2001; Ward, Curtis, 
& Chapman, 1991). Consequently, certain performance 
measurement frameworks, which comprise a set of indi-
cators or measures, have been formed and adopted in the 
construction industry. Yang, Yeung, A. P. C. Chan, Chiang, 
and D. W. M. Chan (2010) summarized three frequently 
applied categories of frameworks, namely, (1) European 
Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) excellence 
model; (2) Balanced Scorecard (BSC) model; and (3) Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) model.
The abovementioned three frameworks have varied 
application levels, despite the absence of absolute differ-
ence in their capability to evaluate a project (Liu et  al., 
2015b; Yang et al., 2010). Performance measurement com-
monly refers to three levels, namely, (1) project, (2) or-
ganizational, and (3) stakeholder levels (Yang et al., 2010). 
The EFQM model is suitable to project and organizational 
levels; the BSC model focuses on organizational level; and 
the KPIs model is the only one applicable among all the 
three levels (Yang et al., 2010).
To measure PPP performance, Liu et al. (2015b) criti-
cally reviewed relevant research and surprisingly found 
that, even in countries with a mature PPP system, many 
PPP projects were not comprehensively monitored or 
evaluated in terms of their implementation, which result-
ed in problems with the delivery of PPPs in different sec-
tors. Noticeably, most current performance measurement 
methods were considerably simplified in practice, ignor-
ing many significant aspects when describing the success 
of PPPs (Liu et al., 2015b). The difficulty in measuring the 
performance of PPPs is understandable as their execution 
intricately involves multiple stakeholders with significant 
conflicts of interest and varied phases unlike one another 
in terms of characteristics and tasks (EIB, 2012). To deal 
with this complexity, some latest studies in PPP domain 
suggested multiple evaluation perspectives, including 
phase (lifecycle)-based perspective, as well as stakeholder 
and process-based perspectives (Liyanage & Villalba-
Romero, 2015; Liu, Love, Davis, Smith, & Regan, 2015a; 
Yuan, Yajun Zeng, Skibniewski, & Qiming, 2009; Liu et al., 
2016). Thus, considering the need to focus on multiple 
levels of performance, these studies mainly adopted the 
KPIs model as the performance measurement framework.
Following the precedent, this research adopts the KPIs 
model as its framework, and the next sub-section forms 
the conceptual framework by reviewing significant indica-
tors used in the literature.
1.4. Conceptual framework
1.4.1. Phase-based perspective
A phase-by-phase evaluation can compartmentalize the 
performance measurement into digestible portions and 
is particularly useful for PPPs with long lifecycles (Liu, 
Love, Smith, Matthews, & Sing, 2016). Each phase in-
volves different stakeholders and procedures, leading to 
varying criteria for performance measurement. In China, 
the Ministry of Finance (MoF) (2014) divides the devel-
opment process of PPPs into five phases, namely, project 
identification, project preparation, project procurement, 
project implementation, and project transfer. Among 
these phases, the first three have previously been ana-
lyzed by prior researchers. Particularly, Chen (2009) also 
utilized the Chengdu Project as case for analysis. However, 
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the two remaining phases still lack empirical evidence to 
demonstrate their performance in practice.
1.4.2. Stakeholder indicators
Generally, PPP stakeholders are individuals or organizations 
that have either an impact on or are impacted by project 
development (El-Gohary, Osman, & El-Diraby, 2006). Three 
indicators regarding stakeholders were frequently consid-
ered, namely, stakeholder satisfaction, contribution, and 
capabilities. Stakeholder satisfaction is particularly impor-
tant in evaluating PPP performance as each stakeholder has 
unique expectations on the PPP outcome (Liu et al., 2015a). 
For example, a government is actively involved in a water 
PPP probably as it aims to fill the existing water demand gap 
in its city. Although a private party is willing to bear the re-
sponsibility of providing quality water that would fulfill the 
government’s goals, its primary motif is the pursuit of profit. 
Both parties’ satisfaction must be met over the lifecycle of 
the project. Stakeholder contribution is in conflict with satis-
faction (Liu et al., 2015a). Whereas the satisfaction indicator 
denotes the expectation of a particular stakeholder from a 
PPP, the contribution indicator denotes the requirement of 
that stakeholder to achieve a successful PPP, as estimated by 
other stakeholders. Stakeholder capabilities refer to neces-
sary skills, technologies, and practical experiences which are 
necessary to operate a business process (Neely et al., 2002). 
This indicator must be evaluated as it reveals whether the 
competitiveness of a stakeholder is sufficient to the task to 
be performed (Neely, Adams, & Crowe, 2001).
1.4.3. Process indicators
In achieving PPP success, the business processes within 
each phase must be grouped appropriately (Liu et  al., 
2015a). Therefore the process effectiveness of each phase 
should also be measured. A series of process indicators 
were emphasized by Hodge (2004), Liu et al. (2015a), Os-
ei-Kyei, Chan, Javed, and Ameyaw (2017), and Yuan et al. 
(2009) (see Table 1).
Table 1. Process indicators used for the evaluation
Code Indicator Source
I1 TCQ (Time, cost and quality) management 1, 2, 3
I2 Health, safety & environment impact 1, 2, 3
I3 Risk management 1, 3, 4
I4 Facility management 1, 2
I5 Dispute management 1, 2, 3
I6 Profitability 2, 3
I7 Contract management 1, 2
I8 Local economic development 3
I9 Reliable product operation 1, 2, 3
I10 Technology transfer 3
I11 Compliance of legal and regulatory framework 2
I12 Public administrative cost 3
Note: 1 – Yuan et al. (2009); 2 – Liu et al. (2015a); 3 – Osei-Kyei et al. 
(2017); 4 – Hodge (2004).
The construction of PPP infrastructure is important, 
with project assets expected to last for some decades. Con-
sequently, the process effectiveness can first be evaluated 
using traditional indicators that were widely used in the 
construction industry. These include such measures as 
TCQ management, and, health, safety and environment 
impact (A. P. C. Chan & A. P. L. Chan, 2004; Atkinson, 
1999). However, given the additional unique features of 
PPPs, such as multiple stakeholders, an emphasis on risk 
allocation, complex contract structures, and reduced pub-
lic costs (World Bank, 2014; EIB, 2012), additional non-
traditional measures require consideration. Thus, these 
measures, including effective risk management, dispute 
management, contract management, and reduced public 
administrative costs, must also be studied to measure the 
process effectiveness.
In PPPs, the private sector is required to assume the 
majority of the responsibilities, not only during con-
struction but also in operating and maintaining the 
project assets. However, such role is compensated with 
opportunity to earn reasonable profit during the con-
cession period. Consequently, the facility management, 
profitability, and reliability of operations also require 
analysis. In developing countries, such as China, PPPs 
are also expected to facilitate the promotion of the local 
economy and the acquisition of technology. Therefore, 
local economic development and technology transfer 
should also be investigated. What is more, the legal and 
regulatory framework for PPP applications significantly 
varies from country to country, resulting in the neces-
sity to evaluate PPP’s compliance with the local legal 
and regulatory framework.
2. Background of the Chengdu project
The Chengdu Project lies in Chengdu city, Sichuan prov-
ince, China. By the end of the 1990s, the daily demand for 
water in Chengdu had risen to 1.3 million m³, yet water 
actual supply could only provide 1.053 million m³. This 
left a significant shortfall of some 250,000 m³ (People’s 
Daily Online, 2000). The situation was made worse when 
contamination further reduced water production of exist-
ing Chengdu plants (Chen & Doloi, 2008). To assuage the 
water crisis, the Chengdu municipal government (CMG) 
initiated a new water plant development program that 
proposed several projects. Of these, the Chengdu Project 
was the only one that adopted a PPP model. It was initi-
ated in 1993 as a traditional water project but was hastily 
suspended due to financing difficulties. The project was 
then revitalized in 1996 under the “National Experimental 
BOT Program,” initiated by the central government. An 
international open bid was held that year and ultimately, 
Compagnie Génénerale des Eaux Group (currently Veo-
lia Group), France, and the Marubeni Corporation, Japan 
were granted the concession. Subsequently, the Chengdu 
Génénerale des Eaux-Marubeni Waterworks Co., Ltd. 
(CGMW) was established as the project company, and 
it began immediate work on the project. The concession 
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period was to be 18 years, including 2.5 years for construc-
tion, with 17.5 years for operation. Actual commercial op-
eration began in 2001, with treated water was delivered to 
the Chengdu Waterworks General Company (CWGC), a 
local state-owned utility. Upon expiry of the 18-year con-
cession period, the plant transferred to the CMG, with 
transfer having taken place on 10 August 2017. Table  2 
summarizes the main features of the Chengdu Project.
The Chengdu Project has nine key identifiable stake-
holders; one more than the eight identified by Liu et al. 
(2015a). They are: public client, shareholders, creditors, 
general concession contractor, subcontractors, suppliers, 
employees, and end-users. The additional stakeholder here 
is the Xingrong Group, which is a state-owned enterprise 
that was designated by CMG as the transferee taking over 
the project after transfer. The complete list of the stake-
holders of the Chengdu Project is presented in Table 3.
As the first official PPP project undertaken in China’s 
water sector, the Chengdu Project was expected to pro-
vide an exemplary precedent for the future development 
of the Chinese water market, and in so doing, attract fur-
ther international and private investment (Chen & Doloi, 
2008). As the first project of its kind, it also attracted the 
attention of industry and academia, alike. Notably, Chen 
(2009) comprehensively reviewed the development pro-
cess of the Chengdu Project, including contract structure, 
and the risk allocation and roles of the main stakeholders. 
Six factors were identified as impacting the re-applicability 
of the project. These were: (1) the flagship status of the 
project; (2) that local government bore relatively more of 
the risks and responsibilities; (3) that lenders participated 
in the project development process; (4) the localization of 
material procurement for construction and maintenance; 
(5) the adoption of reliable and economical technology; 
and (6) the complicated approval procedure and time-
consuming development process. Chen concluded that the 
Chengdu Project could provide an important benchmark 
but could not be adopted as a template for future water 
projects.
Nevertheless, the Chengdu Project triggered a surge 
in PPP water projects throughout China. Its contractual 
structure and risk allocation scheme, for example, have 
been duplicated across numerous water supply plant 
projects. Yet, as mentioned previously, this project was 
not without its critics, with many experts and scholars 
questioning the effectiveness of the PPP model adopt-
ed. With the Chengdu Project now transferred back to 
the CMG, the moment is right to revisit the project and 
reassess its effectiveness and document its lessons.
This paper continues the evaluation by picking up 
where Chen left off, and explores the remaining two 
phases, i.e. the project implementation and transfer phase. 
However, considering that the implementation phase in 
fact comprises a construction and operation stage that are 
totally differ from each other in terms of procedures and 
deliverables, in this paper these are examined separately. 
That is to say, in this paper, the Chengdu Project is exam-




This paper adopted case study as the main research 
methodology. Case study is deemed suitable and effec-
tive in facilitating practitioners’ acquisition of lessons and 
experiences from the best practices extracted (Zhang, 
Chan, Feng, Duan, & Ke, 2016), which is also the ob-
jective of this paper. Besides, PPP projects in certain 
Table 2. Summary profile of the Chengdu No. 6  
Water Plant B Project
PPP model Build Operate Transfer (BOT)
Financial closure year 1999
Project contents A water plant, water intake 
facilities, a 1,030-m discharge 
pipeline, and a 27-km 
water transmission pipeline 
(DN2400 mm) linking the 
water plant to the urban water 
distribution network.
Capacity of the water 
plant (1000 m³/day)
400
Total investment (US$ M) 106.5 (32 as equity + 74.5 as debt)
Contract term (years) 18
Sponsors Veolia (contributing 60% of equity)
Marubeni (contributing 40% of 
equity)
Lenders ADB (contributing $48 million 
of debt)
EIB (contributing $26.5 million 
of debt)
Note: ADB – Asia Development Bank; EIB – European Investment Bank.
Table 3. Stakeholders of the Chengdu No. 6  











Omnium de Traitements et de 
Valorisation
SADE Compagnie Generale de Travaux 
d’Hydraulique
Suppliers 50 percent local companies
Employees All Chinese
End-users Residents in Chengdu
Transferee Xingrong Group
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circumstances frequently have unique characteristics, 
thereby considerably challenging the adoption of exist-
ing knowledge focusing on places with different contexts 
(Cruz, Marques, & Pereira, 2015). This feature causes 
the development of PPPs a highly complicated, project-
specific process. To increase PPP success under a particu-
lar circumstance, an in-depth analysis of cases under the 
same circumstance could be much helpful (Zhang et al., 
2016). Thus, a considerable amount of previous research 
has utilized case study as a method to investigate diverse 
PPP topics (e.g. (Wu, Liu, Jin, & Sing, 2016; Sobhiyah, Be-
manian, & Kashtiban, 2009; Chen, 2009; Jefferies, 2006; 
Şentürk, Yazici, & Kaplanoğlu, 2004; Wang & Tiong, 2000; 
Tiong, 1990)), which proved its suitability in PPP area. 
Especially in China, case study has emerged as the most 
popular research method adopted by PPP researchers 
from 2005 to 2014 (Zhang et al., 2016).
This paper employed a crucial case study method (Ger-
ring, 2007), that is, a single case, the Chengdu Project, 
was selected as research object for the following reasons: 
(1) this paper aims to establish an authentic revelation of 
the lifecycle performance of China’s water PPPs; thus, cases 
that underwent the entire concession period could be suit-
able. The Chengdu Project remains to be the only water 
PPP with that accomplishment in China; (2) the Chengdu 
Project is also the first official BOT project in Chinese wa-
ter sector; as mentioned earlier, many significant aspects, 
such as governance structure, risk allocation and payment 
mechanism, have been duplicated by most, if not all, of the 
subsequent water PPPs in China (Chen, 2009). Therefore, 
this case is a representative of numerous water PPPs, and 
insights from which could benefit the management of all 
those projects; and (3) a trend exists in PPP area to use 
single typical project as a case to gain empirical knowl-
edge (Wang, Tiong, Ting, Chew, & Ashley, 1998; Cheung 
& Chan, 2009; Shen, Platten, & Deng, 2006).
In particular, a triangulation method was adopted to 
perform case analysis, including the following four cross-
checking approaches: literature review, archival analysis, 
questionnaire survey, and post-survey interview. First, a 
literature review was conducted to identify established 
PPP performance indicators. This was followed by a 
structured questionnaire survey of key stakeholders who 
have experienced Chengdu Project over its lifecycle. A 
post-survey interview was then conducted to provide re-
spondents a chance to elaborate their evaluation of those 
indicators. Additionally, an in-depth archival analysis was 
also conducted to corroborate and augment findings from 
the prior procedures. Final conclusions were drawn after 
the triangulation and verification of the outcomes from 
these various sources. Figure 1 summarizes the overall 
research design.
3.2. Collection of data
Figure 2 illustrates the various data collection methods. A 
wide range of archival data regarding the Chengdu Project 
have been collected from inception to completion. These 
data cover the economic, financial, technical, legal, and 
environmental aspects of the project, including the project 
proposal, government directives, feasibility study report, 
bidding documents, contract documents, financial re-
cords, safety records, QA and QC files, project completion 
reports, environmental appraisal reports, interim perfor-
mance check reports, audit reports, and media news and 
reports. The archival data revealed key performance data, 
such as TCQ of construction, volume of water produced, 
water quality, and the project’s financial condition.
To cross-check the archival data, and to augment any 
missing information that may be pertinent to the per-
formance aspects of the project, questionnaire surveys 
and post-survey interviews with key stakeholders of the 
project were carried out. The questionnaire consists of 
questions asking respondents to evaluate the overall per-
formance and performance indicators identified from lit-
erature (refer to section 1.4) across each phase of the pro-
ject. Structured questions were tailored, contingent upon 
the role of the respondents. Specifically, in line with ADB 
(2006), the respondents were asked to rate items to be as-
sessed according to discrete criteria, namely, unsuccessful, 
partly successful, successful, or highly successful. The rat-
ings from unsuccessful to highly successful were trans-
lated into numbers from zero to three; subsequently, the 
mean value for each indicator was calculated for statistical 
analysis (ADB, 2006). After completing the questionnaire 
survey, the post-survey interview was immediately con-
ducted to pursue explanations and clarifications regarding 
particular rating items; and hopefully to solicit a wide-



















Figure 1. Research design
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complementary comments toward the project). Audio 
records of post-survey interview were then transformed 
into an interview transcript that was further processed 
through thematic analysis to extract both manifest and la-
tent information regarding the performance evaluation of 
the project (Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013). Each 
respondent was given a code to facilitate the revisit of the 
data as the analysis was conducted.
To ensure the comprehensiveness and authoritative-
ness of the data garnered, respondents who meet two 
criteria were considered, that is, (1) having experienced 
the project over its entire lifecycle and (2) representing 
distinct roles in managing the project. That is, the pur-
posive sampling technique was adopted for data collec-
tion. The purposive sampling is believed as the most ef-
fective way to extract insights from experienced experts 
(Chan et  al., 2017). Given that the project has been 
operational for almost 20 years, identifying respond-
ents who met this required familiarity with the project 
over this lengthy period proved difficult. The operator, 
CGMW, was believed to possess most knowledge on 
the project as it had been operating the plant for nearly 
20 years. Therefore, the connection with the core man-
agement members of CGMW was built first through 
personal relationship. Through them as well as other 
personal channels of the authors, slowly building con-
nections happened with other significant stakeholders, 
such as Veolia, CMG, and CWGC. Surveys were con-
ducted on four occasions (i.e. 3 August 2015, 20 Feb-
ruary 2016, 9 May 2016 and 9 May 2017). Ultimately, 
a total of 12 respondents partook in the study. Among 
these participants, nine were senior management rep-
resentatives from the public and private sectors, and 
the other three were end-user, residents, and water us-
ers (see Table 4). All respondents had close and long 
connections with the Chengdu Project and possessed 
profound familiarity and understanding on it, based on 
their respective roles. Considering the strict criteria of 
choosing respondents and the narrow scope for sam-
pling, this number of respondents was acceptable. Ad-
ditionally, since evaluating an actual PPP project seems 
sensitive to many practitioners in China, the manner 
of approaching the senior management members from 
distinct stakeholders (i.e. using private relationship) 
was practicable and efficient.
4. Findings and analysis
Several stakeholders were not represented in the survey 
process. These included the creditors, subcontractors, sup-
pliers, and transferee. Compared with the primary stake-
holders interviewed, their relationship with the Chengdu 
Project was comparatively shorter and significantly weaker 
involving far less complicated responsibilities. Thus, their 
performance may be evaluated sufficiently from relevant 
archival data. The archives confirm that they all achieved 
their principal objectives through the project. The credi-
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Local residents 1 8
End-users 2 17
Total 12 100
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tors, ADB and EIB, engaged in the project from as early 
as the preparation stage, with the purpose of promoting 
infrastructure development in China and recovering the 
loan and interest, which were achieved through the pro-
ject operation. Similarly, the subcontractors, suppliers and 
transferee all attained their expectations of the project by 
actively carrying on duties required by the contracts.
Nine of the respondents, those from the public (i.e. 
CMG and CWGC) and private sectors (i.e. Veolia and 
CGMW) completed the entire survey and post-survey in-
terview; whereas the remaining three, one local resident 
along with two end-users, could offer only limited evalu-
ation because they lacked exposure to the development 
process of the project. Therefore, statistical analysis was 
based on the completed feedback of the nine respondents. 
The statistical results were then verified by using archival 
data to improve the objectivity of the findings. The fol-
lowing sections present the research findings and analysis 
from the phase-based perspective.
4.1. Project construction
On 10 September 1999, 20 days after financial settlement, 
CGMW convened representatives of the project construc-
tion contractors for the first regular meeting. This step sig-
naled the practical start of the project construction phase. 
The entire construction phase lasted for 29 months, with 
the following three stages: preparation (five months from 
September 1999 to January 2000), construction (23 months 
from February 2000 to December 2001), and commission-
ing stages (one month from January to February 2002).
The public and private sectors had a rather posi-
tive evaluation of the Chengdu Project’s construction, 
awarding 2.5 and 3.0 to the overall evaluation, respec-
tively (see Figure 3). All the respondents agreed that 
the TCQ of construction was achieved in a high level 
of success. This result was expected because the award-
ing process was open and fair, ensuring that the inter-
national procurement and subcontracting processes 
guaranteed the abilities of the concessionaire, contrac-
tors, and subcontractors. Given a strong aspiration for 
a desirable construction outcome, all participants fully 
contributed to the project construction phase. In gen-
eral, the construction phase was very successful as seen 
from the key stakeholders’ perspective.
Seven process indicators were evaluated in the con-
struction phase (see Figure 3). Although both public and 
private sectors agreed with the successes of I1, I2 and I12, 
they held varying opinions on the remaining four indica-
tors. Of these remaining four, CGMW held a highly posi-
tive evaluation; however, the public sector expressed a di-
vergent, lower satisfaction with them. This can be seen in 
Figure 3, as I5 (1.25), I11 (1.5) and I3 (1.75). Dispute man-
agement or I5 stands out as having the lowest evaluation 
of the public sector. One technology expert from CWGC 
(referred to as CWGC 1) explained that such judgment 
was mainly due to the disputes during the construction 
stage that frequently ended with a significant compromise 
from the public sector. To support this point, CWGC 1 
provided a few examples:
Out of cost considerations, CGMW proposed a 
16-mm thickness for the DN2400 transforma-
tion pipeline, which was two  mm thinner than 
China’s 18  mm standard. This disparity led to 
negotiations between us, yet CGMW’s position 
stood and the 16-mm proposal was adopted at 
last. Moreover, there were occasions when design 
and construction were carried out simultane-
ously over the construction phase, which is con-
trary to Chinese construction regulations. Such 
compromises borne by our side directly contra-
vened our laws, setting a very bad example to 
the future! What is more, reduced standards of 
construction increased the risk to quality as well.
(Technology expert, CWGC 1)
For these reasons, the public sector also offered rela-
tively low ratings to I11 or compliance of legal and regula-
tory framework, and I3 or risk management.
By contrast, the private sector believed the construc-
tion of the Chengdu Project to be particularly successful, 
in terms of processes and outcomes. Two senior manag-
ers from CGMW and Veolia (referred to as CGMW 1 
and Veolia 1, respectively) emphasized that success was 
guaranteed due to their rich experiences and expertise in 
delivering water projects:
We have much confidence in our expertise and 
management systems. Indeed, the construction 
of the Chengdu Project could have been com-
pleted much earlier if the government had been 
more efficient in its own preparation work, like 
their delays in the delivery of temporary land for 
pipeline construction.
(Senior manager, CGMW 1)
As to the violations of Chinese construction standards 
and regulations, they defended themselves by expertise 
and experiences as well:
The standard we adopted had been tested and 
approved across many previous projects com-
pleted around the world. We insisted on our own 
standard because it was, in our experience, safe 
enough, while at the same time greatly reducing 
construction cost.
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Figure 3. Mean values of the evaluation on project 
construction phase
Note: OP – Overall performance
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4.2. Project operation
At 0:00 on 11 February 2002, CGMW formally com-
menced the commercial operation of the Chengdu water 
plant. To date, the plant has been running at full capac-
ity (400,000 m³/day) for over 15 years. The plant’s water 
has been stable and uninterrupted by technical problems, 
despite experiencing numerous extreme events over this 
operational period. According to the operations record, 
the most common risk events totaling 17 as of 2016, con-
cerned the reduction in quality of raw or treated water. 
These events were typically caused by extreme weather 
conditions (e.g. storm rain) or accidental events (e.g. 
power outage).
A senior manager from CGMW (referred to as 
CGMW 2) considered the greatest threat to the operation 
of the water plant as an example, that is, the 8.0 magni-
tude Wenchuan Earthquake, which occurred on 12 May 
2008 and led to over 100,000 casualties in total, to show 
its strong emergency capacity:
Although only 60  km away from the epicenter, 
our facilities, along with 27 km pipeline, suffered 
negligible damage. This was due to our strong 
seismic resistance engineering. At that time, the 
in-place disaster response drills proved effective. 
As per the contingency plan, the power depart-
ment summarily switched to the backup power 
supply to circumvent the power outage, while the 
safety department immediately checked the most 
dangerous chlorine dosing system to ensure that 
no leakage had occurred. After resuming normal 
production, we also responded to prevent poten-
tial secondary disasters, such as flooding due to 
dam failure, water pollution by chemical leakage 
or debris washing into the river etc. that could 
occur at any time. We remained in close com-
munication with the relevant departments over 
the duration of the crisis, making adequate ar-
rangements for processing technology, personnel 
allocation and drug reserves. Moreover, in addi-
tion to the fixed water supply amount, from 21 to 
28 of May 2008, we successively managed three 
emergency water treatment facilities to provide 
emergency water supply services to the most af-
fected areas.
(Senior manager, CGMW 2)
Although the Chengdu Project has earned wide rec-
ognition for its positive handling of emergency circum-
stances, a range of assessments were made by the stake-
holders. From the survey results, a clear distinction exists 
in the evaluations of the operation phase between the pub-
lic and private sectors (see Figure 4). Respondents from 
the private party consistently expressed high satisfaction 
levels in the operation phase, with a perfect score, 3.0, in 
its overall evaluation. Whereas the score achieved from 
respondents representing the public side averaged a mere 
1.25, sitting between “partly successful” and “successful”. 
Their conflicting evaluations were closely related to the 
different expectations to the Chengdu Project, which can 
be seen from their post-survey explanations.
For the private party, the key objectives were profit, 
and market share. A senior manager from CGMW (re-
ferred to as CGMW 3) described the achievement through 
the Chengdu Project:
First, stable income was successfully achieved 
over the 18 years’ concession period. Second, and 
more importantly, market access into China’s wa-
ter sector has been gained through this project. 
Actually, we were awarded a successive series of 
further PPP contracts following the Chengdu 
Project, covering not only drinking water treat-
ment but also entire water supply services, sew-
age treatment and industrial water operations.
(Senior manager, CGMW 3)
For the public sector, the Chengdu Project was expect-
ed to address the financial dilemma faced by the govern-
ment in developing urban water infrastructure with lim-
ited investment capacity. However, the government failed 
to anticipate that the water demand in Chengdu did not 
rise as expected at the start of operations. A respondent 
from the government (referred to as Gov. 1) thoroughly 
introduced this unfortunate incident as follows:
The expected water demand did not appear; how-
ever, CWGC was required to purchase 400,000 
m3/day of treated water, according to the offtake 
agreement. Under these circumstances, CWGC 
had to shut down some other water plants in or-
der to fulfill the contract, which turned the oth-
erwise profitable status of CWGC into a deficit of 
RMB 150 million yuan, in the first year. As a re-
sult, CMG had no recourse but to offer more than 
100 million in subsidies to CWGC, over the first 
few years.
(Official, Gov. 1)
However, the unanticipated situation also fully reflect-
ed the contribution and capability of CMG. Despite bear-
ing a huge burden caused by the commitment to make a 
daily purchase of 400,000 m3 of treated water, CMG never 
defaulted. Meanwhile, CGWC took active measures to al-
leviate its financial difficulties by expanding the water net-
work into nearby suburbs with an updated pipeline net-
work and by gradually reforming the water price upwards 
to accord with market price levels. CMG’s compliance 
with the contract highlighted its good credit standing, 
along with its financial capacity to manage PPPs.
From the public sector’s perspective, satisfaction in 
the operation phase was relatively low owing to the un-
expected decline in demand, whereas the responsiveness 
and effectiveness in handling this unexpected develop-
ment were successfully achieved. In the estimation of the 
private party, all the three indicators were seen to have 
achieved a high level of success based on the criteria of 
stable income and continued quality water provision over 
the entire operation phase.
As for process indicators, the public and private sec-
tors regarded factors I2, I4, I6, I8, I9, and I11 as success-
ful. The mean values for these indicators were rated at 2.0 
or above (Figure 4). Both sides acknowledged the profit-
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ability of the plant, which is attributed principally to the 
stable income guaranteed by the offtake agreement. They 
also believed that the production process of treated water 
was reliable, healthy for the environment, and beneficial to 
the local economy. Moreover, they believed that all facili-
ties were well maintained over the entire operation phase.
For the remaining process indicators (I3, I5, I7, and 
I12), the private party maintained a positive evaluation 
close to highly successful. Conversely, the views from 
the public sector diverged, with respondents inclined 
to choose a performance between partly successful and 
successful for these four indicators. In particular, they 
expressed least satisfaction with I12 or public admin-
istrative cost. This result was expected to be lower as a 
consequence of using PPP procurement instead of using 
traditional means of financing. One respondent from the 
government (referred to as Gov. 2) referred to this indica-
tor as follows:
The lowering of overall costs was a critical reason 
for us to employ PPP. However, the unexpected 
decline in water demand definitely resulted in ex-
penditure increase, which probably was the most 
debatable issue about the project.
(Official, Gov. 2)
Increased public cost seems to have reflected poorly 
on other aspects of the operation phase, such as the criti-
cism to risk allocation, contract management, and dispute 
management, as further argued by Gov. 2:
We believe that the allocation of market risk was 
unfair. It should have been more appropriately 
apportioned to both parties. Additionally, the 
contract terms offered little space for us to ne-




Under the terms of the concession agreement, CGMW 
would transfer the Chengdu Project to CMG after 15.5 
years of operation without further compensation. On 
11 August 2015, the transfer committee of the Chengdu 
Project was set up to facilitate the transfer process. The 
transfer committee acted in the capacity of a temporary 
coordinating agency, mandated to facilitate the consent of 
the public and private parties on the terms of the transfer 
arrangement. The committee comprised three representa-
tives from the public sector and three from the private 
sector. On 10 August 2017, only two years after the first 
transfer committee meeting, a grand transfer ceremony 
was held on site, marking the official close of the conces-
sion period.
The stakeholder satisfaction was achieved in the trans-
fer phase. By contrast with prior phases, the evaluation 
of the transfer phase received close similar assessments 
from the two parties. The mean values of the overall evalu-
ation were both above two (2.2 and 2.5) (see Figure 5). 
This finding means that the transfer phase was regarded as 
generally highly successful. The success was mainly repre-
sented by the complete transfer of numerous items within 
a limited transition period, as admitted by the respondents 
from both parties:
They (CGMW) did a good job. More than 180 
items of equipment across all its facilities had 
been thoroughly overhauled, with no less than 
800 further items undergoing careful checks pri-
or to transfer.
(Senior manager, CWGC 2)
It was absolutely a successful transfer. According 
to the signed memorandum, all operational is-
sues arising over the previous two decades had 
been investigated and resolved over the transfer 
period.
(Senior manager, CGMW 1)
To complete all these tasks within the limited frame, 
both sides actively participated in the transfer process. For 
example, less than one week after the first transfer com-
mittee meeting, CMG sent technical experts to the water 
plant in order to verify the overhaul plan; and CGMW 
went further, taking the initiative to start the overhaul be-
fore it was officially approved. As a result, the stakeholder 
contribution was achieved in this phase.
Of the three representatives from CMG, the one from 
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administra-
tion Commission of Chengdu Municipal Government 
(SASAC-CMG), stood out as dominant. The other two 
were from the Chengdu Municipal Development and 
Reform Commission, and the Chengdu Water Authority. 
However, this personnel arrangement could still be im-
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proved for enhanced capacity in dealing with the transfer, 
as analyzed by CGMW 4:
The problem is that, SASAC-CMG was well 
experienced at managing state-owned assets. 
Nonetheless, this one (the Chengdu Project) was 
a full foreign equity owned company. As a result, 
some issues outside of the traditional capaci-
ties of SASAC-CMG arose in the earlier part of 
the transfer phase, and this in turn undermined 
the efficiency of the transfer committee reaching 
consensus on how to effect the transfer.
(Senior manager, CGMW 4)
Among nine process indicators related to the transfer 
phase, seven (i.e. I2, I3, I4, I6, I10, I11, and I12) were re-
garded as a success or above by the majority of respond-
ents. These indicators mostly referred to the normal op-
eration of the project. Thus, their success was attributable 
to factors similar to those found in the operation phase.
Still, two process indicators, namely, I5 or dispute man-
agement and I7 or contract management, were assessed as 
only partly successful, with mean values between one and 
two (Figure 5). Such evaluation is mainly explained by 
the intense dispute over the final overhaul plan that arose 
among the transfer committee members. Specifically, the 
committee could neither agree on the checklist items, nor 
on the condition of assets to be overhauled. This dispute 
reflected two important deficiencies regarding transfer 
management. First, no established criteria exist for the 
final overhaul of the water project. In keeping with pro-
tecting their own interests, the two parties interpreted 
requirements in terms favorable to their own positions. 
Second, the concession agreement offered little help de-
fining standards of the required overhaul. However, this 
scenario was understandable since the agreement was de-
signed nearly 20 years ago, just as Official Gov. 2 stated:
In my opinion, it was practically impossible for 
contract designers to forecast precisely, back in 
the 1990s, what assets would be in place at the 
time of transfer after 20 years of operation.
(Official, Gov. 1)
5. Discussion
5.1. Summary of the lifecycle performance 
measurement
Based on the analysis of the lifecycle evaluations of stake-
holders representing various perspectives on the project, 
plus insights drawn from earlier research, the Chengdu 
Project can be concluded as generally successful. Its suc-
cess lies in its efficient project preparation, competitive 
project procurement, excellent financing, high quality 
construction, stable operation, and comprehensive trans-
fer back to the public. This conclusion is supported by the 
evaluative survey results on the project.
The project’s success can also be gleaned from the 
abundant desirable outcomes generated over the project 
development process. As evidence, the project’s contract 
structure and risk framework over the project preparation 
phase has been benchmarked by many similar projects that 
followed (Chen, 2009). Chinese subcontractors and suppli-
ers participating in the construction phase have managed to 
earn profits while gaining experience in engaging in an in-
ternational construction project, benefiting from associated 
technical and managerial knowledge transfers (Han, 2006). 
Similarly, end-users have enjoyed the supply of sufficient, 
high quality water throughout the project’s concession pe-
riod. Moreover, the local government benefited from the 
project by collecting substantial tax receipts.
5.2. Causes for dissent
The above analysis indicates that the dissent mainly origi-
nated from two key problems: the loss of public benefits 
due to the inaccurate prediction of water demand in 
Chengdu and the excessive compromises the public sec-
tor was forced to make over various negotiations that oc-
curred. Notwithstanding, a lifecycle analysis reveals that 
these two problems had complex causes, and that these 
do not reflect on the PPP procurement process per se or 
on the Chengdu Project itself.
The singular trigger for the decrease in water demand 
was a revision in the Chengdu City development plan. The 
new plan required several industrial companies to move 
out of the urban area. Notably, these companies collectively 
consumed a significant proportion of the city’s water supply. 
Compounding the problem, the water distribution network 
of that time was majorly underdeveloped, and was not con-
nected to those outer regions where those companies re-
located. Besides, the forecasting methods by which CMG 
predicted water demand were also outdated, and this status 
increased demand forecast error rate over that period (Han, 
2006). Under these conditions, loss of public benefits was 
inevitable, regardless of the financing model adopted in pro-
curing and developing the water plant. Nonetheless, from 
a lifecycle perspective, the problems caused by decreased 
water demand lasted for only three years, after which the 
situation improved with the expansion of the water distri-
bution networks and accompanying water price reforms. As 
water demand increased, the problem resolved itself. By the 
end of the 2000s, peak water demand had reached 1.5 mil-
lion m3/day, requiring yet another water plant to be built in 
order to fill the shortfall.
As to the second problem, excessive compromises 
by CMG during negotiations were more a reflection of 
China’s shortages in experience and bargaining power in 
dealing with international enterprises in the 1990s. Re-
turning to the example of the pipeline thickness dispute, 
a technical director at CWGC admitted that had this issue 
been defined more clearly in the bidding documents, the 
dispute could have been avoided.
5.3. Recommendations to industry
In the public utility area of China, the role of PPPs has 
shifted from the experimentation in the 1990s to becom-
ing the staple means by which infrastructure projects are 
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provided to the public. Unfortunately, for some lower tiers 
of governments, the PPP model is still occasionally per-
ceived as merely a disguised form of borrowing. This situ-
ation raised a concern of the central government (Central 
People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 
2017). Most domestic investors who are the current main 
players in Chinese PPPs still have limited knowledge and 
experience in developing PPPs. To a certain extent, China 
currently remains in another new, large-scale experimen-
tal stage. Similar to the 1990s, such status requires the 
management of a considerable amount of uncertainties. 
Based on the analysis above, the Chengdu Project can pro-
vide significant lessons and experiences to better develop 
PPPs in China’s water sector.
First, with PPP project numbers continuing to grow, 
comprehensive project preparation and competitive pro-
curement procedures should be emphasized. The Chengdu 
Project took three years to work through all the proce-
dures, from initiating the idea to signing the concession 
agreement. This was regarded as rather efficient as the pro-
ject received strong support from the central government 
and ADB (Chen, 2009). By contrast, in completing the 
same process for PPP projects in Sichuan province today, 
where the Chengdu Project is located, only nine months 
on average are now needed. The fastest case took a mere 
one month (Roca Consulting, 2017). Given such short pe-
riods, determining whether these projects underwent the 
due diligence and comprehensive preparations necessary to 
circumvent ambiguities and disputes that may arise down 
the road remains unclear despite their seeming efficiency.
China’s regional governments should further improve 
the institutional environments in which PPPs develop and 
operate. Institutions are believed to be closely linked to 
the healthy promotion of PPPs and foster the industrial 
culture, legal regimes, and administrative systems required 
for their promotion (Zhang, Gao, Feng, & Sun, 2015). The 
institutional environment in the 1990s under which the 
Chengdu Project was developed, was thin at best. The 
high efficiencies achieved came many through special and 
exceptional approvals from the government in what was 
seen as a test case, which would now be next to impossible 
to replicate (Chen, 2009). Therefore, a complete institu-
tional environment is indispensable to achieve high effi-
ciencies. Although a series of policies and regulations with 
respect to PPP have been vigorously promulgated since 
2014, China’s institutional environment regarding PPPs 
remains far from ideal. For instance, apart from low-level 
guidelines and by-laws, the absence of comprehensive PPP 
regulations persists. In fact, the two leading departments 
that hold jurisdiction over PPPs in China, namely, MoF 
and NDRC, still have not clarified the boundaries of their 
responsibilities. This ambiguity is accompanied by certain 
issues being covered by both departments, with occasional 
contradictory or conflicting regulations. Consequently, 
some important stakeholders, such as private investors 
and lenders, have assumed a wait-and-see attitude to 
PPPs. This scenario excludes important potential players 
from the market at a time when they are much needed.
Considering the increasing market-oriented character 
of the water sector and other public utilities in China, the 
Chinese government, at its various levels, needs to fos-
ter independent market players that can represent public 
interests while protecting their own in line with market 
rules. In the Chengdu Project, CWGC as the representa-
tive of CMG, had not fully expressed its own goals during 
the project development process, which became one of the 
key causes of conflicts in the construction and operation 
phases, and which even lowered the efficiency of the re-
cent transfer phase.
For investors and sponsors alike interested in China’s 
water sector, important insights can be found in the gen-
eral success of the Chengdu Project. First, foreign inves-
tors can have confidence in the credibility of the Chinese 
government. For a long period, the Chinese government’s 
actions were viewed by the international investors as key 
political risks detracting from the appeal of the Chinese 
PPP market (Ke, Wang, Chan, & Cheung, 2011; Xu et al., 
2010). However, CMG’s abidance to the terms of the con-
tract throughout the project lifecycle sends a positive sig-
nal that the Chinese government does have the capacity to 
fulfill its contractual obligations and further respect agree-
ments. Remarkably, foreign investors should pay attention 
to the significant changes related to PPP applications in 
China. The market has become more competitive now that 
a great number of domestic enterprises are technologically 
capable and active in the marketplace. Government thus 
possesses more bargaining power, and the rewards to con-
tractors may not be as lucrative as those enjoyed by Veolia 
in the Chengdu Project.
For domestic investors that are not as experienced or 
capable as their global competitors, finding a complemen-
tary partner or establishing consortium like that of the 
Veolia-Marubeni partnership may be strategically neces-
sary. According to Kumaraswamy, Ling, Anvuur, and Rah-
man (2007), a suitable consortium team must not only be 
capable of dealing with hard/technical issues, which is of 
course primarily essential to the success of PPPs, but also 
should relationally integrated with other criteria, such as 
common project objectives, useful mechanism based on 
and beyond classical contractual practices, and sensitivity 
to sustainability issues, etc. In China, few large conglom-
erates possess all those criteria, and thus cooperation be-
tween investors remains critical to PPP success.
With respect to the contract management stage, three 
issues are worthy of particular emphasis under the cur-
rent circumstance. First, risks in the long operational 
stage should be well managed. While as a topic risk has 
drawn significant attention from researchers focusing 
on the different phases of the PPP life cycle (Bao, Chan, 
Chen, & Darko, 2018), analysis on the Chengdu Project 
empirically proved that maintaining continuous caution 
on PPP risk is critical. An important reason is that the 
institutional environment for China’s PPP development 
remains immature, which may lead to unexpected risks 
(e.g. demand decrease in the Chengdu Project) as policies 
are frequently changed. Moreover, the water sector per se 
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is characterized as sensitive to the natural condition (e.g. 
extreme weather and environmental pollution), requir-
ing full preparation from practitioners to encounter the 
risks caused by force majeure. Second, an effective dispute 
resolution system should be established. Distinct motiva-
tions may create disputes between the public and private 
sectors, especially in the contract management stage, in 
which over 96% of disputes appear (Chou, Hsu, Lin, & 
Chang, 2016). These disputes are commonly resolved us-
ing methods such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration, 
and litigation (Chou & Lin, 2012). Unfortunately, a stand-
ardized procedure to employ these resolutions effectively 
to the PPP case remains in its infancy in China. Finally, 
monitoring the contract compliance of the outputs must 
be reinforced. Monitoring PPP performance in accord-
ance with concession agreement is one of the major tasks 
in the contract management stage (EIB, 2012). However, 
this task has been poorly implemented by the public sec-
tors in many countries owing to reasons, such as meas-
urement complication and inadequate resources and tools 
(Robinson & Scott, 2009). As China owns the largest num-
ber of PPPs, of which most are actually unknown to the 
public in terms of their performance, this problem could 
be significantly critical and thus demands urgent efforts 
from the entire industry.
5.4. Implications to the performance measurement 
of PPPs
Apart from recommendations to the industry, theoretical 
implications to the performance measurement of PPPs can 
also be deduced from the case analysis.
The research results offer empirical support to the ne-
cessity of measuring PPPs from multiple perspectives, and 
more critically, indicating the imperfection of the current 
frameworks for the performance measurement of PPPs. 
Although prior research has suggested various measur-
ing frameworks from multiple perspectives (e.g. Liu et al., 
2016; Liyanage & Villalba-Romero, 2015; Liu et al., 2015a; 
Yuan et  al., 2009), their conceptual models have lacked 
practical validation. By analyzing the Chengdu Project, 
the PPP performance has been confirmed to vary from 
different perspectives.
However, the case study also identified several defi-
ciencies of the current frameworks to deal with lifecycle 
performance. As mentioned previously, a few models have 
been employed to measure performance in many indus-
tries, whereas prior researchers in PPP domain have relied 
heavily on KPIs model (Liu et al. 2016; Yuan et al., 2009). 
Despite the advantages possessed by the KPIs model, oth-
er potential methods could be explored in PPP domain 
to cross-check the measurement efficacy of existing ones. 
In addition, the main technique to establish a quantitative 
evaluation of KPIs is to gather individuals with relevant 
expertise to provide a score. This technique requires re-
spondents to possess a profound understanding of or in-
volvement in the project. Otherwise, the viewpoints of the 
respondents could be biased. Unfortunately, according to 
the practice of this study, achieving such ideal situation is 
highly difficult. Moreover, another interesting finding is 
that, even for one single perspective, a single stakeholder 
evaluating the performance of a PPP may also be uncertain 
to some extent. Take the public sector of the Chengdu Pro-
ject as an example. During the survey process, mixed and 
occasionally even conflicting feelings on the project can be 
easily noticed from the representatives of the public sector.
Although many performance factors have been exten-
sively discussed in prior research, the findings of this pa-
per highlight the criticality of assuming a historical angle 
when evaluating the lifecycle performance of PPPs. Here, 
historical angle means considering particular historical 
backgrounds when evaluating past events. Most of the 
existing research tend to draw conclusion simply by the 
performance of certain indicators of a project (Raisbeck, 
Duffield, & Xu, 2010; Rajan, Gopinath, & Behera, 2014). 
However, the reasons behind the performance of a certain 
indicator have not been emphasized sufficiently. Moreover, 
PPPs are originally designed to reduce the holistic cost 
during the entire lifecycle. Consequently, a temporary in-
crease in cost may not seriously influence the project from 
the considerably long lifecycle perspective, similar to the 
three-year’s increase in the public administrative cost for 
subsidizing CWGC in the Chengdu Project case.
These abovementioned implications remind the aca-
demia that current performance measurement frame-
works of PPPs are still preliminary, incapable of com-
prehensively and precisely capturing the genuine perfor-
mance of a complicated PPP. Thus, precise and reliable 
measurement frameworks, as well as empirical studies are 
urgently required.
Conclusions
After nearly 30 years of development, China has built 
an extraordinary number of PPP infrastructure projects. 
However, little is known of the project performance of 
these existing PPPs. Such paucity hinders the attempt to 
draw best practices from those numerous cases to improve 
management strategies and facilitate future developments 
of PPPs in China. By contrast, the performance measure-
ment of PPPs has been studied by a few prior studies that 
proposed several frameworks for measuring PPP perfor-
mance. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of those frame-
works requires further validation via empirical evidence.
To fill the gaps in practical and theoretical terms, this 
paper conducted an in-depth case study on the Chengdu 
Project, which has been transferred to the government on 
10 August 2017 after 18 years of operation. This chosen 
case notably became the first and only water PPP com-
pleting the entire concession period in China. Performing 
the case analysis required using a triangulation method, 
including literature review, archival analysis, questionnaire 
survey, and post-survey interview. The cross-checking ap-
proaches provided comprehensive sources for data collec-
tion, based on which, qualitative and quantitative analyses 
were conducted.
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The findings of this paper, including earlier results re-
garding the Chengdu Project from literature, confirm the 
success of the Chengdu Project from a lifecycle perspec-
tive. This claim was based on multiple pieces of evidence, 
focusing on both the main stakeholders’ understanding of 
the project and absorbing objective archival data. Moreo-
ver, the authors discussed the reasons for dissent between 
stakeholders’ various evaluations by relating the project to 
particular historical backgrounds. Considering China’s cur-
rent stage of evolution in the PPP development, recommen-
dations to the industry and implications to performance 
measurement theory were offered on the basis of the lessons 
and experiences drawn from the Chengdu Project.
The outcomes of this paper fulfill the three research 
objectives. PPP participants in China can gather lessons 
from this research, irrespective of their role or relation-
ship regarding PPPs. Moreover, researchers can find in-
spiration in this paper to identify and resolve particular 
problems hampering the development of PPPs in China 
and to improve the ongoing research on the performance 
measurement of PPPs.
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